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ABSTRACT 
This unpublished paper was developed out of a numerical example posted on the PEN-L list in 
June 1995 and submitted to ROPE September 1996. It demonstrates that, contrary to the 
‘Fundamental Marxian Theorem’ (FMT) and the claims of the surplus (post-Sraffian) school, a 
positive net product is not a necessary condition for a positive profit. That is to say, a positive 
profit may arise even though society produces less than it consumes of at least one good.  
Given technical progress, negative net products are not a pathological exception but a perfectly 
normal and indeed, rather usual state of affairs. Technical progress implies that society replaces 
one product with another –steam with internal combustion, mechanical transmission with 
electrical power, the abacus with the computer, or simply the 286 chip with the 386, the 586, 
the Pentium, and so on. The principal consequence of technological obsolescence, in short, is 
that as a product is phased out, society will cease producing it but continue consuming it. That 
is, capitalism, as a normal aspect of its functioning, produces negative net products. 
For the surplus school this makes exploitation inexplicable, since this school relies on the FMT 
to derive exploitation – the ‘theorem’ that in Steedman’s (1997:53) words 
The conditions for profitability, production of physical surplus and ‘production’ of surplus 
labour are … identical. 
This paper established for the first time that this statement is false. 
This subsequently became central to the 2007-2008 controversy between Mohun, Veneziani, 
Kliman and Freeman, cf ‘Replicating Marx: a reply to Mohun’, Capital and Class No. 88, 
Spring 2006, pp 117-123, and ‘Simultaneous Valuation vs. the Exploitation Theory of Profit:  A 
summing up’, Capital and Class No. 94, Spring 2008. 
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Negative net products with positive profits 
Alan Freeman, University of Greenwich 
INTRODUCTION: WHY A POSITIVE NET PRODUCT? 
In the economic literature, the idea that society must produce a surplus of everything is 
widespread enough to be accounted an axiom. It has supplied the name of an entire body of 
thought, the ‘surplus school’. It is the stated or unstated premise behind the idea that surplus 
labour is reducible to a surplus physical product. More broadly, the analysis of society in terms 
of the distribution of this product is widely perceived as a generic alternative to marginalism 
and the subjectivist view in economics. 
Under the assumptions usual in linear production theory1 a positive net product is a sufficient 
condition for a positive equilibrium profit rate. This has spawned, almost unnoticed, the 
complementary idea that it is also necessary, so that the two ideas of a positive net product and 
positive profits can safely be identified. Thus for example Ian Steedman (1977:53): 
The conditions for profitability, production of physical surplus and ‘production’ of surplus 
labour are thus identical. 
This is an error. A positive net product is not necessary for positive profits and these conditions 
are therefore not identical. A simple numerical example shows that systems with negative net 
products can and do yield positive profits. 
Given past excitement concerning negative surplus value and positive profits, it would hardly 
be just to pass over this lapse without comment. Two questions arise: what condition is 
necessary for positive profits? And what economic meaning attaches to it? 
A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
Consider the following economy in which two producers, PI and PII, produce and consume the 
following amounts of two commodities, CI and CII as follows in 1995.  
IN PI PII Total Inputs  
CI 4 1 5  
CII 4 1 5  
OUT   Total Outputs Net Product 
CI 8 0 8 +3 
CII 0 3 3 -2 
 
During 1995 a physical surplus of 3 units of CI is produced and there is a physical shortfall of 2 
units of CII. Society has converted 2 units of CII into 3 units of CI. 
The standard linear production model simultaneous price equations for the maximum profit rate 
R are given by the requirement that the price pi, (i = 1,2) of each output should equal the price 
of its inputs plus a uniform profit markup, as follows: 
 (4p1 + 4p2)(1+R) = 8p1 
 (p1 + p2)(1+R) = 3p2 
This yields R= 20% with prices as follows: 
 (4p1 + 4p2) × 1.2 = 8p1  
 (p1 + p2) × 1.2 = 3p2 
which is satisfied, in units of CII, by 
 p1=1.5,  p2=1 
                                                     
1
 See for example Manara (1977:5), Pasinetti (1977:62) 
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Both profits and prices are thus positive. We have not specified labour inputs but it should be 
clear that this does not substantially alter the basic facts. Should PI and PII each employ one 
worker consuming a real wage of ½ unit of CII, for example, then these workers could purchase 
their CII when production is complete, with a profit rate of about 7% and approximate price p1 = 
1.3, again with CII as numéraire. 
THE FEASIBLE AND THE REAL IN ECONOMIC THEORY 
The assumption of a positive net product in all commodities is usually introduced in a 
remarkably cavalier manner. One of the more circumspect is Manara (1977:5) who gives it as 
an ‘unstated assumption’ defined thus  
The overall quantity of every commodity used as a means of production is less than the total 
quantity of the same commodity produced in the whole economic system 
and comments 
we intend to accept the opinion of the economists, who are better able to evaluate the 
soundness of the hypotheses themselves and of their economic implications. We shall limit 
ourselves to pointing out that without these hypotheses (or equivalents) the [standard linear 
production model]…would not be ‘viable’. 
The economists themselves are less given to caution. Steedman’s views, in a work which 
attaches some importance to logical coherence, have been cited. Pasinetti (1977:62) declares  
Negative commodity components of the net production or negative production coefficients 
would have no economic meaning. 
Even more strongly (p97) he asserts 
If the condition were not satisfied, it would mean that the economic system considered is so 
technically backward as to yield a negative rate of surplus, i.e. to use as means of production 
greater quantities of commodities than it would then be able to produce. Such a system could 
obviously [sic] not survive; it would not be viable. 
Roemer (1981:19) simply says 
The Marxian notion of reproduction means that the system should create institutions and 
ideology that enable it to continue existing, 
which though reasonable hardly justifies what follows: 
We do not try to capture this deep idea, but rather the simple economic prerequisite that the 
economy should not operate in such a way as to run down some necessary stock to zero, in 
which case further production would be impossible 
A short period of unprejudiced reflection shows that a physical surplus of all goods is neither 
obvious nor a requirement of survival, and in no sense a prerequisite for society to create 
institutions and ideology that enable it to continue existing. Moreover, it does happen. To 
assume it is, in the coarse language of the street, wrong. 
Reproduction, replacement, and change 
An organism can reproduce in many ways without reproducing every part of itself identically 
and this is the norm rather than the exception. If some good, necessary at one time, becomes 
unnecessary at another time and is replaced by something else then its stock is indeed run down 
to zero. That is what replacement consists of. 
The general philosophical problem of social analysis is not to explain how something can 
remain identical to itself in every respect at all times, a phenomenon which is hardly ever 
observed in raw nature let alone civilised society, but to understand how it can persist though 
every part of it changes. How can it be that the economies of the industrial revolution and the 
dawn of the third millenium are in vital respects the same society, even though we have no 
practical use for almost anything the Victorians did or made, except to collect it, regret its 
passing, or build careers on refuting it? 
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Modern society with growing abandon substitutes one thing for another. New machines 
ceaselessly drive out the old. Even more rapidly do new consumer goods follow one on the 
other through the dictates of fashion and the insatiable search for enjoyments. The negative net 
production of nonbasics has become almost a definition of what they are. 
Moreover, the deeper we penetrate the actual structure of the commodity, the more intractable 
this problem becomes. If we examine the real range of options exercised by consumers both 
productive and unproductive in purchasing any actual product whether wines, cars, trainers, 
computers, factories or even humble corn, we find the reproduction of the product by society in 
identical form is extremely unusual; what we actually buy is not the same thing but the latest 
model, which all too soon replaces the outdated. It might be argued this level of detail is too 
fine. But the difference between, say, a 486 and a Pentium computer is a lot greater than the 
difference between a new 486 and a year-old 486. Yet according to many the issue of fixed 
capital has been solved precisely by this second distinction. 
Finally and by no means least, market societies periodically experience not only general gluts 
but their converse, general shortages in periods of expansion. Surpluses are expressed as 
additions to stocks, and these same stocks are reduced in booms. This corresponds to a shortfall 
of production. Stocks are the objective expression of supply and demand imbalances, and were 
it not for negative net production many would pile up without limit. 
If a theory inconveniently fails to capture this vibrant reality, the recommended scientific 
procedure is allegedly to adjust the theory. There is no obvious basis for ruling out negative net 
production a priori; it is on the contrary the normal and natural state of society as we know it 
for most of what we consume and produce. 
Real viability and the consequences of stocks 
The real problem is both simpler and well-known to physics: society cannot consume what it 
has not yet produced. Therefore first, we are obliged to make things before we consume them, 
and second if we consume more than we currently produce, we use up the results of past 
production. Correctly stated, the viability condition is hence that consumption be no greater 
than the total of production and stocks. No further constraint can legitimately be deduced from 
the physical facts alone, and this condition does not demand a current physical surplus. 
In the early history of linear production systems this was known, discussed and formalised, for 
example in the dynamic model proposed by Leontieff (1953). In the early history of the 
‘viability condition’ it appears as the Hawkins-Simons condition2 which is not a prerequisite for 
long-term equilibrium, but tests when an economy is running down its stocks – that is, whether 
it is accumulating or decumulating. This original dynamic conception has been lost, or more 
accurately discarded, and an altogether poorer static conception has been substituted. In this 
particular case, older is better. 
We are drawn to the conclusion that the assumption of positive net production is not a 
description of reality but a convenient way of setting aside an extremely awkward logical 
problem.  
NOTATION 
Our notation can be found in many standard textbooks on the question. For simplicity we deal 
with the maximum profit rate unless otherwise stated so that wages do not figure as costs; 
readers who introduce wages will find the results no different. 
Basic definitions 
A is a square n×n matrix in which Aij gives the consumption by producer j of commodity i in a 
year, during which all goods are assumed to turn over once. X, a matrix giving gross 
production, is assumed diagonal (no joint production). Neither simplification alters the 
qualitative results. The row vector p gives unit prices with pj = price of good j. 
                                                     
2
 See Hawkins (1948), Georgescu-Roegen (1951), Leontieff (1951,1953) 
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Derived definitions 
Define a, the coefficient matrix, as AX–1. With X diagonal, aij gives the amount of commodity i 
consumed per unit of output j. It is positive if no input is negative and there is a positive gross 
product, that is each industry produces something, assumptions I don’t challenge. The net 
product Y = Σj(X–A) may however have negative elements. 
PROFITS 
The vectors pA, pX respectively give the total costs and total sales receipts of each industry. 
Adopting for now the widespread assumptions of constant prices and a uniform (maximum) 
profit rate r, the vector pA(1+r) – costs plus profits – must equal sales pX. Hence 
 pA(1+r) = pX (1) 
This can be expressed as an eigenvalue problem as follows: postmultiply by X–1 to give 
 pa(1+r) = p (2) 
Dividing through by 1+r gives 
 pa =λ p (3) 
where λ = 11+r  (4) 
The conventional problem is to find a unique profit rate and vector of relative prices which 
make this economic system ‘plausible’; that is, permit producers trading at such prices to 
replenish their inputs and their annual consumption out of sales income. Otherwise put, the 
problem is to find how the system can reproduce itself identically in kind. 
The literature is dominated by the requirement that r and p should be positive. What provides 
for this? Since a is non-negative it has a positive maximal eigenvalue λ, making 1+r positive 
but not necessarily r. It also defines, to within a constant of proportionality, a positive row 
eigenvector p which can be identified as the equilibrium price, and a positive column 
eigenvector q, to which we will return. The latter represents a scale on which industries could 
produce to provide for so-called balanced growth – including negative growth – where every 
industry shrinks or expands in the same ratio as the proportions of each commodity in the net 
product. 
As is well-known and indicated above, these facts do not guarantee a positive r. The pair [A,X] 
could provide a positive λ and p and nevertheless, if λ is greater than 1, the rate of profit (and 
growth) will be less than zero. A further assumption is therefore required to guarantee a positive 
profit rate. This is where a positive net product is conventionally introduced. 
WHY ASSUME A POSITIVE NET PRODUCT? 
This is usually introduced in the following way 
(1) The economy must be viable, that is, produce a surplus of every good. Otherwise it would 
run out of something. 
(2) Viability thus defined is equivalent to Y≥0. 
(3) This assumption guarantees positive profits. 
(4) Therefore there is nothing more to worry about. 
But this argument runs one way only. It establishes that a surplus of everything will yield 
positive profits. It does not establish that this is the only condition for positive profits. Instead, 
it simply rules all other options out of order as either embarrassing or ignorable – two oft-
confused objections. 
In the language of mathematics a positive net product is sufficient but not necessary for positive 
profits. What does this tell us? Actually, not very much. For example, a sufficient condition for 
success in almost anything is a brass lamp with a big green genie that does what you ask when 
you say ‘free market’. This is interesting but not very useful. 
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Much more useful would be to know minimum conditions – threshholds under which a market 
society, according to this treatment, could not sink. Bare minimum conditions for anything are 
in general hard to establish or even define, but we can at least seek necessary conditions, which 
tradition fails to furnish. 
First, however, let us enquire why a physical surplus is in fact a sufficient condition for positive 
profits. Construct the dual of a, a matrix a* defined by 
 a*=X–1A  (5) 
This contrasts with a, defined we recall as AX–1. Each element j of row i of a* is gotten by 
dividing the consumption of commodity i in industry j by the total output Xi of this same 
commodity. It gives the proportion of the output of each commodity consumed by each 
industry. Summing across all industries to obtain Σja*ij gives the proportion of the output of 
each commodity consumed by society. If this total is greater than 1 for any commodity i, then 
more i is consumed than produced. Conversely, if there is a surplus of everything then for each i 
 Xi ≥ ΣjAij  (6) 
that is 1  ≥ Σj
Aij
Xi  (7) 
where 1 is the unit vector [1,1,…1]. Hence 
 1  ≥ Σjaj* (8) 
that is, all the row sums of a* are less than 1. Matrix norm theory tells us3 that any upper bound 
of the row sums of a* must be an upper bound for its maximal eigenvalue. Thus the maximal 
eigenvalue of a* must be less than 1. But the eigenvalues of a are the same as those of a*.4 
Hence positive profits. In summary, to repeat, a physical surplus of everything guarantees 
positive profits. However 
1. This assumption does not correspond to observed reality, as we have already discussed. In 
general there will always be negative net production of something,  usually many things; 
2. It is not mathematically necessary. Many pairs [A,X] produce positive profits though Y = 
Σj(X–A)  is not uniformly positive, as we have shown. 
This seems to me to leave a fairly large hole in conventional surplus theory. Prior to poking 
around inside it, let us establish an economically-comprehensible necessary condition for 
positive profits. This is quite well-known; the problem is its interpretation. 
THE FORMAL SOLUTION 
As von Neumann (1937) indicates, the balanced growth rate is the same as the profit rate. To 
find out when profits will be positive we can solve the dual problem: under what conditions is 
positive growth possible in every sector? The world possible is important. 
Suppose a yields positive profits. This implies that a maximum eigenvalue λ less than 1. Now 
consider the column eigenvector q corresponding to λ; 
 aq = λq (9) 
Substituting λ<1 yields 
 aq < q (9) 
An equivalent condition is that some vector q exists for which net output is positive. This is a 
formal necessary condition for positive profits. It is normally interpreted quite glibly as stating 
that the economy consumes less (aq) than it produces (q). 
                                                     
3
 The theorem is due to Gershgorin. Seneta (1973) reproduces Gershgorin’s simple proof. Householder () 
is a definitive account of matrix norm theory. 
4
 By definition a = AX–1 and a*=X–1A. So if p is an eigenvector of a with pa = λp, then pAX–1 = λp. Now 
consider the vector p* = pX. We have p*a* = p*X-1A = pA = paX = λpX. Thus pX is an eigenvector of a* 
corresponding to the same eigenvalue λ.  
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Actually, it tells us nothing of the sort. It states that were an economy to produce output qi, and 
were it to consume inputs in the same proportion as the actual economy, then such an economy 
would produce more of everything than it consumed.  In claiming that the sufficient condition 
Y≥0 is also necessary, tradition commits the cardinal error of confusing the ideal with the real; 
it identifies hypothetical output q with actual output  ΣjX. 
We can now see how our simple numerical example allowed for positive profits. Instead of 
what ‘actually happened’ in our example, we can construct a different economy with the same 
coefficient matrix but different output scale. Since for our economy  
 a = 



1/2 1/3
 1/2 1/3   
this is given by the following equations: 
 q1 = 1.2 × (1/2q1 + 1/3q2) (11) 
 q2 = 1.2 × (1/2q1 + 1/3q2) (12) 
where q1 and q2 are the outputs of CI and CII respectively. This is satisfied for any q1=q2; for 
example q1=q2=8. The economy would then look like this: 
IN PI PII Total Inputs  
CI 4 8/3 20/3  
CII 4 8/3 20/3  
OUT   Total Outputs Net Product 
CI 8 0 8 4/3 
CII 0 8 8 4/3 
 
This yields positive profits and a positive net product. But what kind of economy is it? PII has 
grown by a factor of nearly three – marginally less likely than a big green genie. Moreover is 
precisely PII’s products that are falling into disuse. In a different context this ideal economy is 
supposed to represent what is ‘socially necessary’ – an image of necessity best described as 
‘quaint’. Should we rush out and restore the lost production of handlooms, Edsels and flared 
trousers before society collapses under the weight of modernity? 
But the underlying problem is even more serious: the economy concerned is imaginary, and not 
only imaginary but impossible. 
COMMENTARY 
We can summarise the outcome of the previous section as follows: the correct statement of the 
‘viability’ condition is not that the economy actually produces a positive net product, but that it 
could in principle do so if reorganised subject to constant returns to scale. 
It is not clear that this is a tremendously useful thing to know, though much has been made of it. 
The British economy could in principle take over the world armed with a brass farthing, subject 
to the assumption that the brass farthing contains a big green genie. Is this information of any 
practical use? Expressed thus, the viability condition is more problematical than normally 
supposed. Let us consider some of its implications. 
First, the actual net product is not positive. Ian Steedman should more accurately have said: 
The condition for profitability of the actual economy is thus identical to the condition for the 
production of a physical surplus in a hypothetical economy which, however, does not and 
could not exist.  
This makes the general case to say the least somewhat weaker. What is the real relevance of an 
imaginary economy? It sounds perilously close to a subjective definition of price and/or value; 
it is a purely ideal, purely mental construction which can only be conceived of as an option in 
the minds of agents. 
Second, there is no guarantee that if the scale of output of any industry did change, the 
proportions of its inputs would remain the same – a highly unrealistic assumption. Sraffa rightly 
stated that he himself did not need to assume constant returns, but his project was limited to a 
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critique of neoclassical economics; far less prudent modern writers deploy, as a practical test 
for reality, an economy so unreal that it cannot even exist. 
A struggle for what? 
Finally, since the world of the feasibility condition is neither real nor possible, it casts a serious 
pall over the widespread idea that exploitation is reducible to the outcome of a struggle for a 
share in some putative physical collection of objects. What physical product do the workers and 
capitalists fight over, if no real economy makes it?  
Only two possible interpretations exist: either people fight to get hold of negative products, 
which is absurd, or they fight for the possession of a product which is not actually produced, for 
an imaginary physical product – one which is, moreover, stuffed full of the very things society 
is trying to jettison. 
But then what is the objective character of this dispute? Why should I fight anyone for a share 
in a load of clapped-out old kipple which could only be gotten from a zombie production 
system? The notion of a struggle for distribution of a physical product which does not actually 
exist is every bit as subjective as marginalism, from which the surplus approach was supposed 
to deliver us.5 And marginalism at least lets us fight for dreams rather than dross. 
The two faces of equilibrium 
The unquestionable fact that we must produce what we consume has mutated into an idea 
which sounds the same but means something utterly different – a condition on the structure of 
the economy, instead of the way it moves. It will doubtless be argued that this idea structure 
affords insight into real movement. This is precisely what we question. 
First, the feasibility condition is every bit as subjective as the ideal abstractions of marginal 
economics. There are no grounds for treating it as in any sense ‘more real’ than a psychological 
preference. 
Second, the idea has become ingrained in heterodox thinking that value is the outcome of, or a 
synonym for, a process of reproduction. This emphasis has a deeply apologetic tinge. It turns a 
contingent outcome – the successful and identical return of an economy into itself – into an 
inviolable axiom. It depends on the same assumption as marginalism – that supply matches 
demand. Equation 1 cannot hold on any other basis. 
Linear production theory is revealed, not as an alternative to neoclassical general equilibrium 
theory but a variant of it. The basis of its long-standing dispute with subjective marginalism is 
its insistence that physicality renders it objective. This claim is false. The physical world to 
which it refers has no objective character. 
THEORISING CHANGE 
It never occurs to those mesmerised by dazzling insights into structure that the cost is to be 
blinded to process. The structural requirement imposed by linear production systems is the 
complete absence of change. Since change is fundamental to actuality, this leaves us without a 
concept of surplus that correspond to anything actual in a changing economy. We ought to 
enquire, therefore, whether there is a real and actual property of a changing economy which 
corresponds to this concept. 
In doing so we must wrench the focus from structure, which abstracts from change, to transition 
which takes change as its starting point. The real world is driven by change. If theory is derived 
from structural assumptions, it presupposes that these are brought about by the process they are 
used to study. But process continuously modifies structure. We cannot deduce any given 
structure to be an outcome or a determinant of a process without first studying this process 
                                                     
5
 This has particularly strange implications for the surplus approach to fixed capital, which requires that 
each machine should each year jointly produce its outputs and an older copy of itself. But reproduction 
then requires that earlier vintages be replaced from current production along with everything else, as if by 
a society of museum curators, fastidiously renewing everything ever made for eternity. 
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independently in its own right. A dispassionate enquiry into the market cannot take as given the 
claims it makes for itself.  
This suggests a different treatment of the whole issue of viability – not as the maximum 
condition for a hypothetical market to reproduce for ever, but as a minimum condition for an 
actual economy to survive from one moment to the next. What we really need to know is what a 
viable transition consist of. The question now appears thus: on the one hand what combinations 
of flows and stocks, in one period, can result from a different combination of stocks and flows 
in the previous period? And on the other, in terms of what unchanging feature of the economy 
may we express what has changed? 
I would argue that this is the real place of the concept of value in political economy. Value, as 
Mirowski (1989) concedes, corresponds precisely to the requirement that something measurable 
in an economy persists through change, without which I find it hard to understand how it there 
can be an economic theory at all. 
Viability cannot be formulated in merely physical terms precisely because the consumption of 
physical goods depends on their distribution through exchange. A society which prices food 
beyond the reach of its citizens is just as unviable as one which fails to produce it. Equilibrium 
theory of all types escapes this annoying little difficulty by declaring price to be the child of 
immaculate reproduction. With the divorce of supply from demand this misbegotten waif is 
orphaned.  
In reaction, schools such as the Post-Keynesians tend to act as if the loss of this category does 
not matter – as if dynamic motion can be more or less directly studied in terms of the traded 
money prices of goods. I dissent. 
First, no science can operate without logically grounded concepts, and if we discard one source 
of them, then we require another. Second, there are quantitative issues which cannot be 
expressed using only observed prices. What is the meaning of the term ‘price level’ if there is 
nothing relative to which prices are measured? If the physical composition of output is 
continuously changing, price indices do not fill this gap. Moreover since production happens 
before consumption – that is, before traded prices are formed – we require a common measure 
of some exchangeable property of objects which can be quantified as the outcome of production 
independent of these traded prices. Otherwise we cannot assess any aggregate properties of the 
outcome of production such as, for example, the size of the product which is to be distributed in 
exchange. And indeed a concept of a surplus of some kind is, it seems to me, indispensable. 
What actually determines the average profit rate? We know from direct observation that it is not 
arbitrarily large, and does not fluctuate without limit. What sets the limits? A concept of surplus 
supplies this information and in so doing informs us on one of the most important questions of 
political economy: what sets the real practical limits on society’s potential for growth and 
change? For all these reasons a concept of value – some measurable quantity in terms of which 
price can be expressed – is hard to do without. 
Real persistence as the source of valid abstractions 
This poses the perennial question: where to begin? On the basis of what initial abstractions may 
a changing thing be analysed, since by making any abstraction we presuppose the persistence of 
some unchanged thing? Our manifesto is to begin from elements actually present and 
observably persistent in the economy as it really exists. 
This counters many of the most common objections to the value abstraction. It does not say an 
abstraction tells us all there is to know about an organism. It does not refer to some Kantian 
unknowable. Nor does it take sides in the long-running dispute between individualism and 
holism – for example, we may determine that the brain is the organ of personal identity. The 
approach suggests which aspects of both whole and part must be studied in order to theorise 
change, namely, those which are actually observed to persist, and to be the actual precondition 
of the coming to be and passing away of all contingent things which are nevertheless aspects of 
the organism.  
A physical surplus is neither a feature of any real economy, nor a precondition of any other 
feature. Nor is any particular physical good. If on the contrary for one month the human race 
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either ceased to labour or found itself unable to purchase the results on the market, the majority 
of it would die. This seems to me a perfectly sensible reason for considering the relation of 
labour to exchange a suitable starting point for the analysis of a real market economy. 
Physical reproduction is the outcome of the value process, that is, of the social relations which 
this represents. In a market society, these are the real preconditions of the physical relations of 
humans to the world.  
Why, for example, is there crisis and why do profits fluctuate through the business cycle? Not 
‘because’ of any particular relation between technical or physical compositions, or ‘because’ of 
any particular structure of physical scrapping or use, but ‘because’ capital accumulates. 
Accumulation denominated in money is precisely what is invariant amid the wild profusion of 
technique. Capitalists have a certain sum of money in their possession after selling their product 
– their profit – and a certain stock of assets denominated in money – their advanced capital. 
They have no option but to add to the first to the second in one form or another and create a 
new stock whose historical money value is greater than before. If they fail to do this, their 
money ceases to function as capital because it no longer earns further profit. The ‘primary 
cause’ of accumulation is the requirement for money to function as capital and earn profits, not 
the technical exigencies of production.  
This is every bit as ‘objective’ as the structure of production but it is not reducible to anything 
purely physical. Mathematically the whole obscure discussion about the falling rate of profit 
reduces to the equation K' = I, where K is capital stock and I is investment. If a positive 
proportion of the surplus, measured in money, is invested then the capital stock measured in 
money must grow. This slumbering fact is known to every trainee bookkeeper, let alone any 
banker, but academia has done nothing but conceal it behind an ever-taller hedge of 
mathematical thorns.6 
Conversely crisis, which expresses the unsustainability of indefinite accumulation, is 
irreducible to a physical event. Its onset is characterised by a general fall in all prices without 
any physical change at all. At this moment accumulation is reversed and capitalists are obliged 
either to cease production or use up productive assets without renewing them, so that I becomes 
negative in money terms. But the causal sequence is as given; it is the fall in prices and earnings 
which provokes the decline in production, not the other way around. 
This overrides the physical configuration in which these money relations – in fact value 
relations – happen to be expressed. One must of course ask how these value relations affect and 
constrain physical structure, but if one demands that they be determined by it, the point gets 
missed. The organism is constructed as a mummy with only the outward form preserved.  
THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF DYNAMIC VALUE THEORY 
If we can quantify a viable transition, we at least set a name on the face of the golem. As 
Harrod, Leontieff and others indicate, the bare equation 
 Y = X – A 
is inadequate; we must add the consumption or increment of stocks of all kinds; that is 
 Y + ∆K = X – A (10) 
where K is a matrix representing stocks of all types. 
Important though the quantitative question is, a more subtle causal issue is involved. If current 
production is axiomatically assumed to match current consumption, the requirement becomes 
through the mathematics a structural constraint on production, as if the producers of today 
were in some sense caused to produce in the correct proportions by the consumers of tomorrow. 
                                                     
6
 If we suppose S fixed, and I' =αS where α is a proportion given by the distance of S/K from some 
‘target’ rate R, we obtain a business cycle driven purely by endogenous profit rate changes. This is not 
meant to indicate the actual course of the business cycle but it does suggest the literature has overlooked 
some simple possibilities. 
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The axiom forms the conduit for a teleological (and apologetic) conception of the determinants 
of production.  
Once stocks are introduced, causal relation follows temporal order: first goods are made, then 
they are consumed. If consumption fails to match production, the result is a change in stock 
levels. There is no causal relation between the consumption decisions of tomorrow and the 
production decisions of today. This was I think the principal reason for the defeat of the 
Austrian view, which sought both to preserve the subjective determination of value and the 
temporal order of production, two requirements which Marshall rightly understood to be 
incompatible.7 
This causal notion is blurred or absent in many dynamic models such as Leontieff’s own, as 
well as the Harrod-Domar literature. These generally try to write down conditions under which 
the consumption provoked by investment can match the output from this same investment, 
restoring teleology by the back door. 
In Keynes and Marx, stocks clearly represent the discrepancy between supply as determined by 
investment decisions in the past, and effective demand as determined by consumption decisions 
in the present. It then follows that the change in stock levels cannot be deduced from the 
requirements of production alone but also from the outcome of consumption. Actual stocks 
move in response to prices.  
The issue of stocks properly treated therefore poses a dual question absent from growth 
dynamics. In the real world the mechanism of stock adjustment is capital movement provoked 
by price change. The simultaneous equation 
 pA(1+r) = pX  
is profoundly inadequate to this purpose. First and not least, the actual motor force of both 
market adjustment and technical change is not the formation of an equal profit rate but 
divergences in profit rates. Otherwise, why should capital move? The idea of an actually 
equalised profit rate is an idealisation to make the equations work, derived from the apologetic 
idea that ‘capital’ is a commodity like any other with its ‘price’ the rate of profit.8 
But second, it expresses the absurd idea that the price paid for a commodity as input at one time 
is equal to the price paid for the same commodity at a later time as output. The price vector then 
cannot change between the start and the end of production; indeed it cannot change at all. The 
superstitious fear of margins has exorcised the mechanism of the market. The traditional 
equations are unreal in a further vital sense; they allow no process by which the market can 
function. 
Once we allow that prices change from one period to another and that profits may differ from 
capital to capital we are driven to seek a dynamic relation of the form 
 (pt+1, rt+1) = f(pt, At , Kt) (11) 
where there as many rates of profit as there are independent capitals and in which a vector of 
tomorrow’s prices and profits arises when yesterday’s supplies meet today’s consumption. 
Such formalisations produce numerically different outcomes. We might pardon a metaphysical 
lapse if the end result was the same. But it isn’t; there is a practical difference. Work long in the 
public domain9 clearly shows that for one of the most central issues of economics – the 
                                                     
7
 See Dobb (1989:185) 
8
 An idealisation not adopted by Marx, contrary to popular prejudice: ‘In actual fact, demand and supply 
never coincide, or, if they do so, it is only by chance and not to be taken into account for scientific 
purposes; it should be considered as not having happened. (Marx 1981:291) ‘Between the spheres more or 
less approximating the average there is again a tendency towards equalisation, seeking the ideal average, 
i.e. an average that does not really exist. (ibid p173: my emphasis), ‘The industrial rates of profit in 
various spheres of production are themselves more or less uncertain; but in so far as they appear, it is not 
their uniformity but their differences which are perceptible. The general rate of profit, however, appears 
only as the lowest limit of profit, not as an empirical, directly visible form of the actual rate of profit’ (ibid 
p367) 
9
 See Kliman (1988), Freeman and Carchedi (1995) 
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movement of the profit rate – equilibrium and dynamic calculations produce diametrically 
opposite results. 
We are now in a very different world, though closer to the one we live in. What causal relations 
govern the transition from pt to pt+1? This is in my view the real object of political economy. 
This idea is not new and is not only held in common with Post-Keynesians10 but implicit in 
revived Austrian theory.11 I also argue it is a far more acceptable reading of Marx.12 The 
discussion which the future holds is, I would argue, a debate between these currents, outside the 
general framework of neoclassical general equilibrium either in its marginal or its linear 
production variant, about the best way to formalise causal relations in such dynamic systems.  
IN PRAISE OF VALUE  
To anyone schooled in the simultaneous equation approach, state transition equations like 10 
and 11 are riotously indeterminate. Every element of today’s vector depends on every single 
element of yesterday’s. 
These systems are riotous because life is. The equilibrium approach represents, in a certain 
sense, a neurotic compulsion to shut out the noise of existence. This is uncalled for; 
indeterminate is not the same as indeterministic. The fact that we cannot capture in a neat 
formula all relations between present and past, does not mean these relations have no real 
existence.  
A system is not lawless by virtue of its degrees of freedom. The ‘law’ of gravity is not an 
equation, a prediction that a given object will move up or definitely down. It is an invariant 
relation which holds whatever objects do. In the same way the problem of political economy is 
to identify those relations which capture such laws of motion as society exhibits, without 
stifling the movements which pose awkward difficulties for the maths. 
Once the notion of physical reproduction is abandoned for the myth it is, the real living being 
emerges. Its motions have to be understood in the language proper to them. Who can 
understand limbs who has not seen dancers? Money is the body language of the market; value, 
however, is its choreographer. 
My purpose in this paper has been to take an axe to the root, to borrow Connolly’s phrase, of 
the idea that this can be done by treating things as the ciphers of people, otherwise known as 
fetishism. I have attacked the sacred link between equilibrium theory and the modern 
reconstruction of the concept of value; the idea that it is no more than the expression of a 
‘physical’ surplus. I think I have shown there is no such thing. 
Axiomatic value dynamics 
I am sure it will be said that by removing the physical underpinning I have removed the basis 
for all valid abstractions, leaving value theory with no foundation and economics with no 
surplus.  
One aspect of my response is to point to persistently ignored work which shows that if the 
interpretation of Marx as an equilibrium theorist is abandoned utterly, a dynamic foundation of 
value and surplus is not only clear in his work but coherent within itself and with reality. But 
this by no means the only such theory. To ascertain what various dynamic theories have in 
common, and what distinguishes them apart, we can begin by defining a dynamic value theory 
axiomatically: 
(1)  the price of any commodity entering production must represent a definite amount of value 
from the past, given independent of the production process in which it is used, 
(2)  it must be possible to calculate the new value added to each commodity when it is 
produced, independent of the price for which that product then sells. 
                                                     
10
 Among many too numerous to mention see Weintraub (1991) 
11
 See O’Driscoll and Rizzo (1996) 
12
 See Freeman and Carchedi (1995) 
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It seems to me just as reasonable and necessary to set dynamic value theory on an axiomatic 
basis, as it was for Arrow, Debreu and Hahn to set equilibrium price theory on an axiomatic 
footing, and that is the enterprise I propose. Any system satisfying these two axioms will be 
dynamic. It will distinguish value from price (price is the value which a commodity realises in 
exchange, as opposed to the value it receives from production). It will formulate the idea of 
economic surplus as the difference between the value that has been produced and the value that 
has been consumed in producing it. It will impose no constraint on physical structure. It will 
possess precisely the characteristics required of a truly general scientific abstraction, which is 
not to assume away all contingent factors but express their most general properties. 
Economics is in one of those crises that occur during prolonged instability in the world. These 
usually call into question its most abiding dogma, that of equilibrium, though generally not for 
long. New approaches are surfacing and now is the time to interact; we need critical 
instruments that can assess the relations of different dynamic theories but also safeguard them 
against the next apologetic reconstruction. As has been remarked, every determination is a 
negation. If economics wishes to know where to go, its first task is to understand what it leaves 
behind. The axioms are proposed with this aim in view. 
The objective and the subjective in value dynamics 
The last point we wish to consider is this: where, within the spectrum of dynamic theory, does 
the vexed distinction between subjective and objective in fact lie?  
The surplus approach sought to distinguish itself from marginalism by identifying objectivity 
with something independent of humans. But the economy is made up of humans. The real 
problem is to ascertain on the one hand how how subjective activity humanises objects and 
how, on the other, human activity becomes objective. 
It is in my opinion only through genuine dynamics that a proper distinction between the 
objective and the subjective in social theory can be drawn. Equilibrium theory contains neither 
actually existing objectivity nor really possible subjectivity. Its excision of the past deletes the 
objective, and its postponement of the future shuts out the subjective. The second half of this 
century has therefore witnessed a battle of Dickensian ghosts. The marginal school reduces 
subjectivity to psychology while the surplus approach attributes objectivity to mere physicality. 
History has no cancel button, and therefore our most elevated ideas become objective facts 
once we have thought them. On the other hand the future is unknown neither because of the 
blindness of the universe or the malice of its gods but because it is our future, so that even the 
most certain of nature’s acts remain conjectures until we have lived them, and our most brutally 
physical creations remain mere ideas until we have brought them into the world. 
Nevertheless, our past acts confront us not just as dead objects but as representatives of our 
present relations to each other. Our view of the world depends, in different ways in different 
theories, on the way human volition is conceived in the light of these facts; on how it is asserted 
that we may exploit the possibilities bequeathed to us by our past actions, in short, on the range 
of possible relations to each other between which we are alleged to choose when we interact 
with the objects of our own creation. 
Becoming conscious of our choices, it has been remarked, is inseparable from making them. 
The task of rational social analysis is to ensure that we make them knowing what they really 
are. This idea, in my view, is what needs to be restored to the science of political economy. 
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